Mar 17 2016
Why don't they just give up on Dibold's e-voting machines? They're already been proven insecure and unauditable beyond the shadow of a doubt. They've already compromised the hardware and software in an undetectible manner. The keys to the locks can be freely purchased online... or fabricated by hand because Diebold put an image of the master key on their website. Because the locks used on the Diebold electronic voting machines are the same ones used on many filing cabinets (the locks of which can be purchased in many hardware and office supply stores), it wasn't hard for Kinard of the 'sploitcast to get a couple of locks and key blanks and cut his own master keys using the image from Diebold's online catalogue for reference. Guess what? Two of this three keys work to unlock the cover of the datacard compartment. Mounting an election rigging attack is as simple as opening the compartment, swapping cards for a few seconds, and locking it back up. The nature of the firmware is such that if it even notices the tampering, it is trivial to erase all traces of same from the system logs. To cover their asses they changed the catalog entries to remove the image (which is still all over the Net) and altered the text to read that a smartcard is used to unlock the machines (it isn't, or at least it isn't for the several hundred thousand e-voting machines now in the field).
These guys don't know when they're beaten.